(a) A creditor's petition can only be presented by a creditor, and untilĪ prospective petitioner is established as a creditor he is not entitled to present the petition and has no standing in the Companies Court: Mann v Goldstein 1WLR 1091.
The principles to be applied in the exercise of this jurisdiction are familiar and may be summarised as follows:. They are conveniently summarised by Norris J in Angel Group Limited v British Gas Trading Limited EWHC 2702 (Ch), which I shall call Angel. Save for one point, there was no dispute as to the legal principles. That means that the issue I have to decide is the familiar one, namely whether the debts on which the statutory demand is based are bona fide disputed on substantial grounds. Rickard and, (iv) this gives him locus to present the petition as if the debts have validity. Rickard (ii) the debts, to the extent there are any, were then payable to Ipulse, that is the LLP (iii) the debts have subsequently been assigned to Mr. I will therefore proceed on the basis that it is common ground that, (i) the statutory demand was served by Mr. Markandya did not dispute that proposition. Rickard, and on the authority of Coulter v The Chief Constable of Dorset Police EWCA Civ 1259 she submitted that this was sufficient to give him locus to present a petition as creditor based on the statutory demand even though he had had no title to the debts at the date of the demand.ĥ Ms. Rickard, for her part accepted that at the date of the statutory demand he was not in fact a creditor, but in the short time since the point had come to her attention Ipulse had assigned all the debts in question to Mr. Rickard was not a creditor at all but wished me to determine the underlying question whether the debts were disputed on substantial grounds. Markandya, however, did not suggest that the injunction should be granted on the simple ground that Mr. I therefore invited the parties to make further submissions on the point.Ĥ Ms. Rickard, who had served the statutory demand but did not appear to be a creditor, or Ipulse, which claimed to be a creditor but did not appear to have served a statutory demand, was in a position to proceed with the petition. It was only when considering my judgment that it became apparent to me that it raised the question whether either Mr. Markandya, who appears for Ensygnia, had briefly referred to these facts in her submissions, no argument was addressed to me on the consequences for this application. In fact, it transpires that all the invoices in question, although received under the name of Ipulse, bear the statement that Ipulse is a trading name of Ipulse IP Partners LLP.ģ Although Ms. Hence, these proceedings were brought by Ensygnia against Mr. The statutory demand was issued in his own name, that is as David Rickard trading as Ipulse, apparently in the belief that the sums payable were due to him personally. Rickard served a statutory demand for what he claimed to be the outstanding fees. Ipulse claim that there are invoices outstanding for work carried out for Ensygnia.Ģ The application has had a somewhat unusual procedural history.
They later changed their representation to Olswangs and disinstructed Ipulse.
#Angel ipulse login registration
Ensygnia instructed Ipulse to assist with registration of patents for Onescan. David Rickard, is a patent attorney and a partner in a firm called Ipulse IP Partners LLP, ( Ipulse ). The applicant, Ensygnia, ( Ensygnia ), is a mobile interaction company whose main product is Onescan, an Omni-Channel App that enables mobile payments online, in store, and on the go, via a Smart phone with a camera. JOHNSON appeared on behalf of the Respondent.ġ This is an application to restrain the presentation of a winding up petition. MARKANDYA (instructed by Olswang) appeared on behalf of the Applicant. One Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HR Official Court Reporters and Audio Transcribers
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